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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. HINCKLEY, INC. 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10260 
This case involves the validity of a deficiency 
assessment for sales tax and the imposition of pen-
alty and interest upon both such sales tax deficiency 
and a use tax deficiency which has been paid. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
TAX COMMISSION 
After formal hearing, the Tax Commission up-
held the assessment of sales tax deficiency and the 
penalty and interest involved herein. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Defendant seeks a judgment upholding the ac-
tion of the Tax Commission in sustaining the de-
ficiency assessment for sales tax and the penalty 
and interest on both the sales tax and use tax. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant agrees in substance with the facts 
as set forth in Plaintiff's brief. However, because 
of some irrelevant material in the stipulation of facts 
entered into by the parties and the statement of 
facts in Plaintiff's brief, the Defendant offers the 
following brief statement of the facts in this case. 
Plaintiff is a Utah corporation, which has as 
its principal business the sale of motor vehicles and 
accessories. (R. 108.) Within the same corporate 
structure Plaintiff also operates a business which 
retails items to the public through automatic vend-
ing machines. ( R. 86, 108.) 
During the period herein, 1954 to 1962, there 
was in effect Tax Commission Regulation S-74, 
(Exhibit 2) which had been promulgated in 1937 
( R. 181) and which reads in part as follows: 
Persons operating punch boards or vend· , 
ing machines are deemed to be retailers and I 
selling articles of tangible personal property i 
which are disposed of in connection with ~he 1 
opera ti on of such punch boards or vendrng ! 
machines. 
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The total receipts from the operations of 
the above will be considered as the total selling 
price of the tangible personal property dis-
tributed in connection with their operations 
and must be reported as the amount of sales 
subject to tax. 
Since 1936 the law has also included the deci-
sion of this Court in the Jensen Candy Company 
case, more fully discussed in Point I of this brief. 
The collection of sales tax was regulated during 
this time by a bracket system which has been in ef-
fect since 1950 (Exhibit 9, R. 168.) 
During the time involved herein plaintiff made 
certain purchases which were subject to use tax but 
upon which no tax was paid. Plaintiff also made 
sales through its vending machines without remit-
ting to the Tax Commission any sales tax based on 
such sales. 
Subsequently, an audit was conducted by the 
Tax Commission, which resulted in deficiency assess-
ments for both use tax and sales tax. (R. 117-164.) 
A 10 per cent penalty and interest at 12 per cent 
per annum were also assessed on both the sales and 
use tax deficiencies. 
Plaintiff paid the full amount of use tax de-
ficiency and the interest at 6 per cent which had 
accrued thereon up to the time of payment. (R. 
110.) Plaintiff refuses to pay the 10 per cent pen-
alty and the additional 6 per cent interest. (R. 180.) 
This leaves an amount in controversy related to 
4 
use tax of penalty of $278.25 and interest of $862.92, 
or a total amount of $1,141.17(12). (R. 116.) 
Plaintiff also paid that portion of the sales tax 
deficiency which represented tax on sales made from 
vending machines where the cost was in excess of 
10 cents per item, together with interest at 6 per 
cent on such amount. (R. 110.) Plaintiff refuses to 
pay the balance of the sales tax deficiency which 
arose from sales made at 10 cents or less per item, 
as well as the 10 per cent penalty on the total sales 
tax deficiency. Plaintiff also refuses to pay the ad-
ditional 6 per cent interest on that portion of the 
sales tax deficiency which was paid and the 12 per 
cent interest on that portion of the sales tax deficien-
cy which remains unpaid. (R. 181.) This leaves an 
amount in controversy related to sales tax of prin-
cipal of $7,086.05, penalty of $1,012.98, and interest 
of $3,117.57, or a total amount of $11,216.60. (R. 
115.) 
Thus, this Court is called upon in this case to 
decide two questions : 
1. Whether sales at 10 cents or less per item 
are subject to sales tax. 
2. Whether the disregard by the plaintiff of 
the Commission's regulations and long established 
case law justifies the imposition of the penalty and 
interest. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
THE PROPOSED ASSESSMENT OF SALES 
TAX ON SALES UNDER FOURTEEN CENTS 
IS LAWFUL AND SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Great stress was placed by the petitioner on the 
fact that certain practical problems of collecting the 
tax on sales of ten cents or less only serves to indicate 
that the legislature could not have intended to ex-
tend the sales tax to these or similar sales. Evidence 
was introduced to the effect that it would be very 
costly to alter the petitioner's machinery so as to 
provide for automatic tax collection, and further, 
that it is unlikely that an equitable tax could ever 
be assessed based upon the fact that there are no 
tokens presently existing in Utah. 
Assuming that these or other similar practical 
difficulties exist, this issue has nevertheless been be-
fore the Utah courts on at least three occasions. 
W. F. Jens en Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
90 Utah 359, 61 P.2d 629 (1936); State Tax Com-
rnission v. City Commission of Logan, 88 Utah 406, 
54 P.2d 1197 (1936); Francom v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 11 Utah2d 164, 356 P.2d 285 (1960). 
The Court has held that the solution to the problem 
raised was a practical and not a legal one and that 
the legislature and the Court would leave the prob-
lems of collection of such a tax to the vendor. The 
Court in the Jensen Candy case found a legislative 
intention to tax sales of less than 50 cents even 
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though the practical problems involved therein were 
greater than allegedly exist in the present case. The 
Court in that case said: 
The vendor has the option to collect the 
tax from the vendee; that is, he may "if he 
sees fit" to do so ... or he may if he sees fit 
elect to pay or absorb the tax himself. 90 Utah 
364, 61 P.2d 632. 
In that case the plaintiff operated a confection-
ary at Logan City, Utah, and a stipulated set of 
facts indicated that most of the sales made were in 
amounts of less than 50 cents; that a large propor-
tion of those were below 25 cents, with many of them 
being 5, 10 or 15 cent sales. The plaintiff therein 
classified its sales according to amounts and calcu-
lated that 30 per cent of its sales were represented 
by 5 cent sales, 10 per cent by 15 cent sales, etc. The 
Court found that a large percentage of the plain-
tiff's business was represented by these small sales 
of less than 50 cents. The plaintiff there paid the 
sales tax on all sales made in amounts of 50 cents 
and over, and the Tax Commission then, as now ' 
assessed a tax on the basis of the total or aggregate 
of the sales made and demanded a deficiency with 
penalty and interest. The question presented to the 
Court there was whether a vendor could collect a 
tax on sales made by him when the sale was in an 
amount of less than 50 cents. The sales tax rate at 
that time was 2 per cent of the purchase price paid 
or charged, and the petitioner argued that the prac· 
tical effect of this requirement was that no sale of 
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less than 50 cents could be taxed because of the fact 
that there were no coins small enough to provide 
for such a tax. This Court said: 
The Sales Tax Act imposes the tax on the 
transaction. The amount of consideration in-
volved in the sale or transaction (a sale always 
involves a purchase) is the measure to which 
the rate is applied .... The vendor or the per-
son receiving the payment or consideration 
upon a sale is charged under the law with the 
responsibility of collecting or accounting to 
the state for the tax imposed .... 90 Utah 
362, 61 P.2d 630. 
The Court then cited Section 5 of the statute, 
which reads as follows : 
The vendor may, if he sees fit, collect the 
tax from the vendee, but in no case shall he 
collect as tax an amount (without regard to 
fractional parts of one cent) in excess of the 
tax computed at the rates prescribed by this 
act. 90 Utah 362, 61 P.2d 631. 
The Court then said that this sentence, partic-
ularly the parenthetical part, was the basis of the 
difference between the parties. Apparently, the 
plaintiff argued that this phrase, in effect, elim-
inated the tax on sales involving fractional parts of 
50 cents, whereas the defendant, Tax Commission, 
argued that the vendor was required to pay all taxes 
actually collected, and whether or not taxes were 
collected, to pay the rate of the tax imposed upon the 
aggregate amount of the sales involved. 
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The Court made reference to the Logan City 
case, wherein it was said: 
It is argued that the city cannot collect 
a sales tax from the consumer who purchases 
electricity for a fractional part of fifty cents; 
that is to say, if the bill of any consumer is, 
say, forty-nine cents, no tax can be collected 
thereon, and likewise, if electrical energy in 
any given month is sold to a consumer in the 
amount of $1.25, a sales tax of only two cents 
is collectible thereon, and therefore if the city 
is required to pay 2 per cent of its total sale 
[sic] it will be required to pay a substantial 
part of the tax out of its own funds. 90 Utah 
363, 61 P.2d 631. 
The Court then said that except for the sub-
ject matter of the sale the foregoing question in 
the Logan City case was before it in the Jensen 
Candy case, and continued: 
The law declares that there is levied and 
collected and paid, as to sales involved in this 
case, a tax of 2 per cent of the consideration 
upon every retail sale of tangible personal 
property. Section 4 (a), id. The language of 
the statute is clear and unambiguous and 
must be given effect. No exemption is pr?· 
vided for sales where the gross amounts is 
less than 50 cents or where the sale involving 
more than 50 cents fails to express its con-
sideration in even units of 50 cents or dollars. 
There being no exemptions, the rate of 2 per 
cent of the consideration paid or charged at-
taches to every sale. If the sale is a 10 centf 
sale, there is due to the state a tax of 1/5 o 
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a cent. That no coins or currency of that par-
ticular denomination, or other fractional me-
dium of exchange, are immediately available 
is not a matter the court may consider in de-
termining the validity of the law. It may pre-
sent a practical difficulty, but not an insur-
mountable one, ... but certain it is that a tax 
levied upon every sale within the terms of the 
statute and the vendor is responsible for the 
collection of it. The vendor may, "if he sees 
fit," collect the tax from the vendee ... or he 
may, if he sees fit, elect to pay or absorb the 
tax himself. He may not within the terms of 
the law require the payment of more than the 
rate imposed by the statute. 90 Utah 364, 61 
P.2d 631. 
The identical argument presented by plaintiff 
was again before this court in the Francom case 
which involved sales made through automatic coin 
operated machines. Although argued in the briefs, 
no mention was made of that argument in the deci-
sion. Apparently the Court deemed it to be with-
out merit. We submit that the argument is again 
without merit in the present case. 
Several other jurisdictions have decided this 
question and upheld the tax. While some differences 
exist in the statutes involved, the basic premises and 
much of the reasoning are applicable in this case. 
See, for example, Calvert v. Canteen Co., 371 S.W.2d 
556 (Texas, 1963); Piedmont Canteen Service v. 
Johnson~ 123 S.E. 2d 582 (N.C., 1962). 
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Point II. 
THE PLAINTIFF, AS VENDOR, IS LIABLE 
FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE TAX. 
Plaintiff argues that "since 1937 the Utah Sales 
Tax Act has placed the legal and economic burden 
of the sales tax on the vendee and not on the vendor." 
(Plaintiff's brief, p. 11.) The idea apparently is that 
to require Plaintiff, a vendor, to pay the tax herein 
is unlawful. Admittedly, the changes since the enact-
ment of the Sales Tax Act in 1933 emphasize the 
duty of the vendee to pay the tax. However, numer-
ous cases, including a number decided since 1937 
when the seemingly most significant changes in em-
phasis occurred, have set forth with clarity the ven-
dor's liability with regard to sales tax. W. F. Jensen 
Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah 359, 
61 P.2d 629 (1936); State Tax Commission v. City 
Commission of Logan, 88 Utah 406, 54 P.2d 1197; 
State Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99Utah177, 
100 P.2d 575 (1940); Dupler's Art Furs, Inc. v. 
State Tax Commission, 108 Utah 513, 161 P.2d 788, 
(1945); E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
109 Utah 563, 168 P.2d 324, (1946). 
The recent case of Ralph Child Construction 
Co. v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah2d 53, 362 
P.2d 422 ( 1961), clearly sets forth the law in this 
state on this subject: 
Under our statute the seller or "vendor" 
is required to collect tax from the purchaser-
ultima te consumer and pay it to the state. The 
11 
primary obligation to pay the tax is on the 
ultimate consumer, but we have repeatedly 
held that a retailer who makes a taxable sale 
must pay the state even though he has failed 
to collect the tax from the consumer. (Cita-
tions.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
Point III. 
THE PROPOSED ASSESSMENT IS CON-
STITUTIONAL. 
We would like to emphasize at the outset that 
in the present case the Court is not confronted with 
an unusual taxing situation. The sales from the 
vending machines, which are herein questioned, are 
a relatively minor part of a large automobile busi-
ness conducted by Plaintiff. ( R. 86, 108.) This case 
can thus be viewed as the normal situation of any 
business concern which may devote some portion of 
its activity to the sale of goods at a price of less than 
14 cents per item. While the use of vending machines 
involves some regulations which may not be involved 
in the case of manual sales, we submit that the basic 
problems concerned herein are not different from 
those faced by the majority of retailers. 
We also note that the constitutionality of the 
! sales tax under the same facts as presented herein 
1 was upheld in the Jensen Candy case. 90 Utah 361, 
' I 61 P.2d 630. 
I The first argument of the Plaintiff seems to 
1
1 be that the constitutional doctrine of equal protec-
1 
12 
tion is violated because sales from vending machines 
are treated differently and discriminatorily when 
compared to sales of similarly priced items not made 
through such machines, that is, manually. We sug- 1 
gest that the statutes and regulations make no dis-
tinction between manual and automatic sales as far 
as the imposition of the tax is concerned. 
U.C.A. 59-15-5, which deals with the collection 
of sales tax, provides that "the tax as computed in 
1 
the return shall in all cases be based upon the total 1 
sales made during the period, including both cash ; 
and charge sales." This statute applies to all sales 1 
and indicates that the total sales provide the basis ' 
for the amount of taxes to be paid. i 
Sales Tax Regulation 7 4 applies the statutory ' 
requirement to vending machines when it says in 
part: 
The total receipts from the operations 
of the above [vending machines] will be con-
sidered as the total selling price of the 
tangible personal property distributed in con· 
nection with their operations and must be ; 
reported as the amount of sales subject to tax. i 
I 
Thus, rather than making a distinction between man·' 
ual sales and those made by vending machines, the I 
regulation merely specifies the application of the I 
statute to one particular type of sale where the~e 
1 
might otherwise be misunderstanding. We submit 1 
that there is no distinction made in either the stat· 
utes or regulations or in practice in the application 
of the sales tax to manual and vending machine sales 
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or to plaintiff and any other retailer in Utah. This 
being so, there is no denial of equal protection of the 
laws to the Plaintiff. 
As a second argument Plaintiff says that it is 
being deprived of its property without due process 
of law because Plaintiff, as vendor, is being required 
to pay a tax imposed on the vendee. We refer the 
reader to Point II of our brief for authorities in sup-
port of the proposition that Plaintiff is only being 
required to perform a duty imposed by statute upon 
all vendors. 
We are uncertain as to plaintiff's position with 
regard to the bracket system. Plaintiff appears to 
rely on the system in an attempt to escape the tax 
(Plaintiff's brief, pp. 20, 21, 25), while at the same 
time seemingly questioning it (Plaintiff's brief, p. 
20). We would suggest that in relying upon the 
bracket system to exempt from taxation sales under 
14 cents the Plaintiff is in no position to question its 
validity. If Plaintiff's position is that tokens or some 
other device must be used by the Commission to facil-
itate collection, we suggest that the following por-
tion of U.C.A. 59-15-5 gives the Tax Commission 
discretion in the device employed and that the brack-
et system is reasonable and lawful: 
For the purpose of more efficiently se-
curing the payment, collection and account-
ing for the taxes provided for under this act, 
the tax commission in its discretion, by prop-
er rules and regulations, shall provide for the 
issuance of tokens or other appropriate de-
vices to facilitate collections; ... 
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The bracket system is devised so that sales made 
in the lower portion of a given bracket are slightly 
overtaxed, while those sales which fall in the upper 
portion of a given bracket are slightly undertaxed. 
It appears to be the premise of the system that in 
averaging the total sales approximately the correct 
amount of tax will be collected, so as to equal the 
amount required to be remitted when computed on 
the total sales. See Calvert v. Canteen, 371 S.W.2d 
556, 558 (Texas, 1963). 
The bracket system is not the law which sets 
the incidence and amount of tax. It is merely an ad· 
ministrative device employed to facilitate collection 
as suggested in the Jens en Candy case and author-
ized by the foregoing statute. (R. 168.) 
In the Jensen Candy case this Court suggested 
a standard by which the constitutionality of the 
bracket system must be sustained: 
It is also recognized that no method or 
form of taxation has yet been devised that is 
absolutely equal and uniform (citation). The 
levy or imposition of taxes may, and is in· 
tended, to approach uniformity and equalit~. 
The actual collection falls short of that um· 
formity and equality. 90 Utah 365, 61 P.2d 
632. 
We submit that the proposed assessment is 
neither discriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable. 
Rather, the Plaintiff is being asked to pay a ~ax 
1 
levied in like manner on all vendors, the collect10n · 
I I 
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of which is regulated in some degree by the lawful 
administrative device of a bracket system. 
Point IV. 
THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY 
AND INTEREST IS PROPER. 
The statutory basis for the imposition of the 
penalty herein is found in U.C.A. 59-15-5, which 
provides in part as follows: 
Any person failing to pay any tax to the 
state or any amount of tax herein required 
to be paid to the state within the time required 
by this act, or file any return as required by 
this act, shall pay, in addition to the tax, pen-
alties and interest as provided in Section 59-
15-8 hereof. 
Section 59-15-8, U.C.A. 1953, provides in part: 
If any part of the deficiency is due to 
negligence or intentional disregard of author-
ized rules and regulations with knowledge 
thereof, but without intent to defraud, there 
shall be added the amount of $2.50 or 10 per 
cent of the total amount of the deficiency 
whichever amount is greater and interest in 
such a case shall be collected at the rate of 
1 per cent per month of the amount of such 
deficiency from the time the return was due, 
from the person required to file the return, 
which interest and additions shall become due 
and payable 10 days after notice and demand 
to him by the commission. 
For similar use tax provisions, see U.C.A. 59-
16-8, 58-16-9. 
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The imposition of such penalty and interest has 1 
been sustained by this Court on several occasions. 
Ford J. Twaits Co. v. State Tax Commission, 106 
Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343 (1944); Dupler's Art Furs, 
Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 108 Utah 513, 161 
P.2d 788 (1945); Ralph Child Construction Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 12 Utah2d 53, 362 P.2d 422 
(1961). 
As was noted in the Commission's findings of 
fact ( R. 181), there were in effect during the period 
covered by the assessment, Tax Commission Regu- · 
lation S-7 4 and a series of cases, including the Jen-
sen Candy case, which unambiguously imposed a 
duty upon plaintiff to pay the taxes in question. The 
Plaintiff also admitted that it was guilty of inad-
vertence in failing to pay the use tax ( R. 69). We 
suggest that failure to pay the tax, in view of the 
statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions then in 
force, "is due to negligence or intentional disregard 
of authorized rules or regulations with knowledge 
thereof" as required by U.C.A. 59-15-8. 
Plaintiff further contends that it was denied 
equal protection and due process of law in being pre- , 
vented from inquiring into the policies and practices 
of the Commission with regard to the assessment 
of penalties. 
A careful reading of the record indicates that 
Plaintiff was not denied an opportunity to investi-
gate the policies of the Commission (R. 27-42). 
Plaintiff stated at the hearing that it desired to 
make such an investigation and was given an oppor-
17 
tunity to explain to the Commission what it intended 
to prove thereby. The Chairman at the hearing in-
dicated that the Plaintiff was free to offer any evi-
dence relevant to the points at issue. 
We believe that the record shows that Plaintiff 
was attempting to enter unsupported testimony on 
issues not before the Commission - issues extra-
neous to Plaintiff's negligence or disregard of rules 
or regulations. Such irrelevant matters were prop-
erly excluded, but without prejudice to the Plaintiff 
to enter any other competent evidence it had. But 
Plaintiff presented no further evidence. We submit 
that such procedure did not unlawfully prejudice 
Plaintiff and really has no bearing on the matter 
of penalty and interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The deficiency assessment for sales tax and the 
penalty and interest on both sales and use tax are 
lawful and should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH B. ROMNEY 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
Attorneys for 
Defendant 
